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ABSTRACT

THE EFFECT OF BELIEF OF VICTORY ON THIRD-PARTY VOTE SHARE:
DUVERGER’S LAW & WHY EVAN MCMULLIN LOST UTAH IN 2016

John Geilman
Political Science Department
Bachelor of Arts

A key reason Duverger’s Law is valid is voter’s belief that a third-party does not
have a chance at winning an election in a “first past the post” electoral system.
Duverger’s Law has traditionally been explained through two reasons—a mechanical
factor and a psychological factor. The mechanical factor focuses on aspects of electoral
systems that work against third parties, while the psychological factor focuses on what
voters think and feel about third parties. In the 2016 presidential election in the United
States, voters in the state of Utah demonstrated that their perception of the electability of
a third-party candidate has a substantial effect on the third-party vote share. The Utah
Colleges Exit Poll surveyed Utah voters during the 2016 election, asking if they would
vote for a candidate other than Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump if the voter thought a
third-party candidate could win Utah.
My research indicates that if people had believed that a third-party candidate
could win the state of Utah and voted for their preferred candidate, Evan McMullin
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potentially could have won the state of Utah and gained 6 votes in the Electoral College.
If that had happened, Trump still would have had the 270 electoral votes needed to secure
the presidency, but McMullin would have been the first third-party candidate to win votes
in the Electoral College since George Wallace in 1968. This finding demonstrates the
importance of the psychological factor in Duverger’s Law. Duverger’s Law was
powerful, even with two very disliked candidates from the two major parties.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my mentor, Professor David Magleby, for how much he has
taught me over the past three years. He taught me the finer details of political science and
how to be a good Christian man. His friendship and mentoring has shaped the rest of my
life. I would also like to thank Professor Joshua Gubler for the hours he spent teaching
me how to reason and how to write. He also taught me to keep life in perspective and to
remember the eternal things.
I would also like to thank my father, David, for supporting me, inspiring me, and
serving as a copy editor on this thesis. My mother, Elizabeth, has been just as important.
She has loved me, helped me through stressful moments, and introduced me to the world
of books. I would also like to thank my fiancée, Sarah, for encouraging and believing in
me.
I would double the length of my thesis if I listed off all of the family, friends,
coworkers, and fellow students who helped me on this project. This project would not be
possible without their love and support. Thank you.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title ...................................................................................................................................... i
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. ii
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... iv
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................v
List of Tables and Figures ................................................................................................. vi
Introduction .........................................................................................................................1
Literature Review and Explanation of Duverger’s Law .....................................................2
Mechanical Factor ................................................................................................... 5
Psychological Factor ...............................................................................................7
Contributions of this Thesis .................................................................................... 9
Context of the 2016 Election in Utah ............................................................................... 10
Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 14
Findings and Discussion ................................................................................................... 19
The Conflicted Voters ........................................................................................... 19
The Feelings Thermometer ...................................................................................21
How to Reapportion The Conflicted Voters? ....................................................... 27
In What Scenario Could McMullin Have Actually Won Utah? ........................... 33
Implications....................................................................................................................... 34
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 37
Appendix A—Front Side of Blue Form............................................................................ 38
Appendix B—Confidence Intervals of the Demographics of the Subset and the Rest of
the UCEP Sample to Prove Representativeness of the Subset ......................................... 39
Notes ................................................................................................................................. 45
v

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1- Voters from Survey ............................................................................................ 19
Table 2- Support Gained from Conflicted Voters............................................................. 21
Table 3- Feelings of Voters Towards Trump, Clinton, and McMullin ............................. 23
Figure 1- The Difference of Mean Feelings That Conflicted and Non-Conflicted Voters
Have Towards Their Chosen Candidate and to Evan McMullin ......................................25
Table 4- Voters from Survey ............................................................................................27
Table 5- Voters from Survey, Moving Conflicted Trump Voters to Third-Party
Candidates ......................................................................................................................... 28
Table 6- Voters from Survey, Moving Conflicted Trump and Clinton Voters to ThirdParty Candidates ............................................................................................................... 30
Table 7- Voters from Survey, Moving Trump and Clinton Voters According to the
Feelings Thermometer ...................................................................................................... 32

vi

Introduction
Every year there are elections held in the United States. Thousands of offices are
filled according to the will of the people. With so many different offices to fill and the
wide variety of ideas, one could reasonably expect to find many political parties vying for
each seat. However, there are effectively only two—the Republican Party and the
Democrat Party. There are other third parties in the United States, such as the Green
Party, the Constitution Party, and the Libertarian Party. There also are individuals who
run as independents, like Ross Perot. These parties do not fare well and rarely win seats,
especially on the national level. Why does this happen? Why do only two parties
consistently win elections? The answer can be found by examining Duverger’s Law.
Duverger’s Law states that in a single-majority single-ballot system, like that in
the United States, there will only be two competitive political parties at the same time.1
The only exceptions to this law are during transition times, when one party is fracturing
and another is coming into power (such as the Republicans and Whigs in the 1800s), and
when there are very strong, ethnically-based political groups, such as in Canada and
India.2 The durability of this law was seen in the United States in the 2016 election.
While Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton were historically unpopular candidates, no
nationally viable third-party option arose. However, there were some third-party
candidates who found limited success. Evan McMullin was one of the third-party
candidates who ran against Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. While he finished with a
lower percentage of the popular vote than Gary Johnson or Jill Stein, he came the closest
to winning a state—Utah, with 21.3% percent of the vote.3

1

Using unique data gathered from the Utah Colleges Exit Poll (UCEP), this thesis
demonstrates how Evan McMullin could have won the state of Utah if people had voted
for their preferred candidate. This finding quantitatively explains the psychological
causal mechanism of Duverger’s Law, something that has not been done to this extent
before. This thesis begins with a literature review to provide context on Duverger’s Law,
describes the situation of Utah in the 2016 election, traces the methodology used to
discover why Evan McMullin could have won the state of Utah, and then closes with a
general discussion on the findings and implications.

Literature Review and Explanation of Duverger’s Law
In the 1950s, Maurice Duverger presented what became known as Duverger’s
Law. He wrote “the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system.
Of all the hypotheses that have been defined in this book, this approaches the most nearly
perhaps to a true sociological law.”4 He qualified his claim by saying “The electoral
system [simple-majority single-ballot] works in the direction of bipartism; it does not
necessarily and absolutely lead to it in spite of all obstacles. The basic tendency combines
with many others which attenuate it, check it, or arrest it. With these reserves we can
nevertheless consider that dualism of parties is the ‘brazen law’… of the simple-majority
single-ballot electoral system.”5 A simple-majority single-ballot system was his term for
electoral systems in which everyone has one vote and do not hold runoff elections if a
candidate did not receive an absolute majority. These systems do not result in coalition
governments. The ballot system he describes is the electoral system used to form the
United States government.
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Other political scientists had written about this same dual-party trait in a simplemajority single-ballot system before Duverger. They include Ferdinand Hermens in 1941,
Herman Finer in 1949, Carl Friedrich in 1950, and V.O. Key Jr. in 1952.6 William Riker
explained why the law is named after Duverger instead of these earlier political scientists,
writing that “It is customary to call the law by Duverger’s name, not because he had
much to do with developing it but rather because he was the first to dare to claim it was a
law. The memorial honors, therefore, a trait of character as much as a scientific
breakthrough.”7 Consequently, Duverger retains the fame for having come up with a
prominent law in political science.
As with all significant claims, it was immediately challenged by other political
scientists. Their challenges were understandable; Duverger had made a bold claim.
Political science is often referred to as a “soft science” because of the lack of concrete
laws. Human nature, although it has predictable tendencies, can still be erratic and is
generally unquantifiable. Most social scientists acknowledge this problem and refer to
those unquantifiable characteristics as “unobservables.” The standard approach is to
attempt various statistical methods to account for that problem.8 For Duverger to claim
that this tendency was a “brazen law” was seen as particularly extraordinary, and not in a
good way. These political scientists then held the law up to the cold light of examination.
As time went on, the most successful attack was done by political scientists who
contrasted the examples of Canada and India. According to Kenneth Benoit,
[both countries have] single-member district plurality electoral systems but both
supporting more than two parties… Conducting the most systematic review (up to
his time) of evidence for and against Duverger’s law, Rae (1971) found that Canada
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offered regular exceptions…Rae suggested a revision to Duverger’s law, asserting
that ‘plurality formulae are always associated with two party competition except
where strong local minority parties exist’ (Rae, 1971, 95). Subsequent attempts to
‘amend’ the laws have tended to do so by offering similar qualifications of
conditions, or by weakening the categorical language suggesting universal
applicability.9
While Duverger later “claimed in a 1986 essay that he had not intended for his
‘law’ to have the deterministic significance later attributed to it,” he clearly had made a
stir in the political science community and enshrined a law that still stands with only a
few tacked-on qualifications.10 For those who live in a simple-majority single-ballot
system it is important to understand why this law works. Elected officials and citizens
both need to know the causal mechanism behind the law to fully understand the effects
that Duverger’s Law has on elections. Duverger wrote,
[that this law] is itself the result of two factors working together: a mechanical
factor and a psychological factor. The mechanical factor consists in the ‘underrepresentation of the third, i.e. the weakest party, its percentages of seats being
inferior to its percentage of the poll…The psychological factor is ambiguous in the
same way. In cases where there are three parties operating under the simplemajority single-ballot system the electors soon realize that their votes are wasted if
they continue to give them to the third-party: whence their natural tendency to
transfer their vote to the less evil of its two adversaries in order to prevent the
success of the greater evil.11
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These two factors—the mechanical and the psychological—are the
reasons that Duverger’s Law stands. Both aspects are important and create
Duverger’s Law as we know it.

Mechanical Factor
Duverger points out that there is a mechanical factor that plays a role in
limiting the power of third parties. The mechanical aspect is the rules and
conditions that set up the electoral structure in a manner unfavorable to third
parties. There are lots of obstacles that limit the electability of third-party
candidates. There are laws requiring a certain number of signatures to be placed
on the ballot.12 Signature gathering requires funding and time, two things that
third parties often lack. There often are filing fees for candidates, something that
consultants warn potential third-party candidates about.13 States have different
filing deadlines, creating a logistical nightmare of keeping track of the efforts in
different states, as well as limiting the access of candidates who don’t enter the
race soon enough. These externalities from election laws make it hard for third
parties to appear on the ballot to run against the major two parties. These
obstacles all hurt Evan McMullin during his candidacy. He missed the deadline
for filing in Pennsylvania (August 1) and Wisconsin (August 2) and consequently
did not appear on the ballots for those two states. He also did not make it onto the
Michigan ballot. These three states are all swing states. His presence on the ballot
could have swung the results in those states. In some states he got on the ballots
after getting 5,000 signatures, such as in Kentucky and Virginia. All in all,
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McMullin only got on the ballots of 11 states, making it hard to be a viable
nationwide candidate.14
There also are obstacles that aren’t codified into law, but are certainly part
of the election structure. These include things such as needing to have a certain
percent of the population supporting you to qualify for nationally televised
debates and finding enough donors to fund both TV ads and a ground game.
Another obstacle is receiving insufficient media attention—the media in a horse
race fashion focuses their coverage on the top two candidates, limiting the amount
of unearned media that third-party candidates receive.
The simple-majority single-ballot itself makes it difficult for third-party
candidates to succeed. In a “first past the post” system, voters naturally coalesce
around two parties. While some view this behavior as psychological, it is clear
that these are the mechanical effects of the system itself.15 These mechanical
effects include the effects that the seats available in a district and the magnitude of
seats in the national assembly have on encouraging or dissuading third party
candidates, something that goes beyond the obstacles mentioned above. These
mechanical effects have been studied by many political scientists, including
Douglas Rae, Michael Gallagher, Arend Lijphart, and Gary Cox.16 They all agree
with Duverger that mechanical effects play an important role in the duality of
electoral systems with a winner take all system. Other political scientists, such as
Leslie Lipson, disagreed with the findings of mechanical effects and claimed that
the number of parties had stabilized due to social equilibrium.17 This theory has
largely fallen out of favor, as demonstrated by the extensive, and ongoing,
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research of Riker, Octavio Neto and Gary Cox, and Benoit.18 Those political
scientists catalogue the history of research into Duverger’s Law in their literature
reviews, going all the way up to 2006 in the case of Benoit.
Political scientists have tried to create predictive models and equations on
the number of competitive parties that will be present in any given country. Rein
Taagepera and Matthew Shubart argue that number of seats in a district and the
overall assembly size have the most impact on determining the amount of
effective parties in a country.19

Psychological Factor
The psychological factor focuses on why voters make the decisions that
they do, differing from the mechanical factor which focuses on setting the
structural conditions for third parties to fail. The idea of a psychological factor
was strongly attacked by some political scientists when Duverger introduced his
law. John Grumm in 1958 wrote that “the examination of the voting statistics of
these countries supplies almost no evidence of the existence of the hypothetical
‘psychological’ factor.”20
Other political scientists have not dismissed it so readily and have tried to
study the psychological factor behind Duverger’s Law. They have met with
numerous problems as they have attempted to study the actual chances third-party
candidates have in an election. One problem consistently encountered was the
lack of quality data on the subject. This was the problem Grumm experienced in
his analysis in 1958.
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Political scientists have come up with creative ways to get around this
problem. Some rely on qualitative observations and hypothetical theorems, such
as Roger Myerson and Robert Weber.21 Others have used cultural cleavages as
their psychological factor to determine the number of political parties that a
country can hold. In 1997, Neto and Cox found that the number of cultural
cleavages, combined with the electoral structure, are indicative of the number of
parties.22 This supported earlier findings by Peter Ordeshook and Olga
Shvetsova.23
Still others have speculated that “the greater the distance between the
voter and the nearest major party candidate, the more likely it is that the voter will
look for a third-party alternative.”24 Political scientists who follow this school of
thought look at voter satisfaction with candidates as they create their models of
voter behavior.25 Others, such as Paul Abramson, use “feeling thermometers” of
favorability instead of satisfaction to determine which candidate should have
fared the best. Abramson, using his feeling thermometer method, concluded that
“at least some voters responded to the wasted vote argument [but that] the
mechanical effects of the plurality-vote-win system had more of an impact than its
psychological effects.”26 His findings, as with others using similar methods, are
full of caveats because they use data that only indirectly measures the electability
of third-party candidates.
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Contributions of this Thesis
With the cry for a third-party that is so often repeated, particularly in the
current politically polarized climate in the United States, why has no group
successfully formed a competitive third-party?27 It cannot be a completely
structural thing, as the literature review has demonstrated. There is no law against
a third-party being formed and many have been formed throughout history.
Looking for other reasons, there must be a psychological factor that affirms
Duverger’s Law. The clear majority of Americans do not know what Duverger’s
Law is but have observed it for decades with their voting behavior. This indicates
that people have a similar mentality about voting for third parties, a mentality that
causes them to shy away from voting from third-party candidates. My thesis
focuses on this psychological factor. I asked voters “Would you vote for a
candidate other than Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump if you thought they had a
chance to get the most votes in Utah?” A similar question about third-party
preferences, in a campaign with a serious third-party contender, has only been
asked once before. During a Voter Research and Surveys (VRS) exit poll in the
1992 election, Gordon S. Black, then CEO of the Gordon S. Black Corporation
(which was later merged with Harris Insights and Analytics) asked 3,900 people if
they would have voted for Ross Perot if they thought he had a chance to win. He
found that Perot would have won the election with 40% of the vote.28 Black did
not use this to explain Duverger’s Law. He concluded that the improper polling
had led the public to believe Perot did not have a chance, which is why people did
not vote for him. Gordon Black used this conclusion to chastise the pre-election
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pollsters across the country and never did anything more with the data.29 His
finding hints at the psychological aspect, but the connection was never explicitly
made. His data and survey methods are not publicly available.
Because his data and survey methods are not publicly available, it is hard
to hold up his findings as conclusive proof of the psychological effect of
Duverger’s Law. For the reasons stated in the sections above, it is hard to
quantitatively test this aspect of Duverger’s Law. Because of my question in the
UCEP, the strength of the methods used to survey voters, and the simplicity of my
analysis, I have a unique data set that quantitatively proves the impact of the
psychological factor on Duverger’s Law.

Context of the 2016 Election in Utah
The election of 2016 was one of the most unusual elections that the United States
has ever seen because Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump were viewed more unfavorably
than any other set of presidential candidates since Gallup began tracking candidate
favorability ratings in 1956. On the week leading up to Election Day, Gallup reported that
Clinton’s 52% unfavorable score was the second worse favorability score ever by a
candidate, beaten only by Trump’s 61% unfavorable score.30 Many people were repelled
by the personality and behavior of Donald Trump, the Republican candidate. He regularly
made offensive comments about Mexicans, Muslims, and women. He also ran on a
populist, protectionist platform that differed from traditional Republican stances, causing
many Republicans to shy away from voting for him. On the other hand, Hillary Clinton
was seen by many as a deeply flawed candidate. Her decades in the public eye had led to
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an accumulation of a lot of baggage, including her comments about young black males as
‘super-predators,’ her mishandling of classified emails, the Benghazi incident, and her
marriage to former president Bill Clinton. The unpopularity of these candidates pushed
voters into an uncomfortable zone where many voters in the middle felt they had to pick a
candidate whose baggage they felt most comfortable with.
In Utah the cross pressure was even more extreme. The majority of people in the
state are members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (also referred to as
the Mormon or LDS Church). Traditionally, most members of the LDS Church lean to
the right of the political spectrum. This has led to Utah voting Republican in presidential
elections. In fact, the last time a Democrat won Utah’s electoral votes was in 1964. In
addition to a tendency to vote Republican, Mormons are known for being a moral
people.31 One of their Articles of Faith states “We believe in being honest, true, chaste,
benevolent, virtuous, and in doing good to all men…”32 Donald Trump’s behavior, both
before and after he became the Republican nominee, did not reflect those virtues.
However, most people in the state of Utah did not want to vote for Hillary Clinton. The
Clinton image was never good in the state of Utah, due to a mix of their political views,
the immorality of Bill Clinton while he was in office, the executive decision by then
President Clinton to create the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, and the
scandals that marred Hillary Clinton’s time as Secretary of State.33
This frustration was felt not just by average Utah voters, but by Utah’s elected
officials, such as Governor Gary Herbert, Senator Mike Lee, and Representatives Jason
Chaffetz, Mia Love, and Chris Stewart. This frustration boiled over after the Access
Hollywood tapes with Trump’s extremely lewd and graphic comments about women
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were reported in the news in October 2016.34 Upon hearing Trump’s recorded comments,
prominent Utahns led the way in withdrawing their endorsements and asking him to step
aside. Governor Gary Herbert was the “first elected official to pull his endorsement from
Donald Trump.”35 Representative Jason Chaffetz was the first member of the US House
of Representatives to withdraw his endorsement of Donald Trump, stating “I’m out. I can
no longer in good conscience endorse this person for president… I can't tell the good
people of Utah that I endorse a person who acts like this.”36 Former Utah governor and
2012 presidential candidate Jon Huntsman also withdrew his support, as did Utah’s
favorite son Mitt Romney.37 The backlash against Trump in Utah was so intense that “the
Deseret News, a media outlet owned by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints,
broke with an 80-year tradition of refraining from presidential endorsements to publish an
editorial calling on Mr. Trump to step aside.”38
The majority of voters could not choose which candidate they felt less
uncomfortable with! They didn’t want to go against generations of Republican voting but
didn’t feel comfortable with Trump’s morality. Then, if they were wavering on voting for
Trump, they were faced with the prospect of voting for Clinton, a daunting prospect that
was a tough pill to swallow for many voters. Donald Trump’s running mate, Michael
Pence, reminded Utahns of what was at stake, promising that they would fight against
abortion, make it easier for religions to speak in the public forum, and appoint a
conservative, pro-life justice to the Supreme Court.39
They also lacked clear cues from their elected officials about which candidates
they should support. While Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Rob Bishop
continued to support Donald Trump’s candidacy, they were fairly muted in their support
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as they both strongly disapproved of Trump’s statements towards women.40 Utahns also
received mixed cues from other elected officials. Governor Herbert declared that he
would not vote for Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton, but did not say who he would vote
for. Representative Jason Chaffetz said he would not endorse Trump but would vote for
him because “HRC is that bad.”41 Caught in this cross pressure, many people felt unsure
what to do, and neighbors began having discussions, both in person and via social media,
about choosing the “lesser of two evils.”42 With no party agreement or statewide
consensus about which candidate felt like the “lesser of two evils,” many Utahns felt
trapped, frustrated with a system that had led them to having to choose between two
candidates that they did not like.
In August 2016, a potential alternative arose. Evan McMullin, a member of the
LDS faith and a graduate of Utah-based Brigham Young University, announced his
candidacy. He ran as an Independent, emphasizing that he did not have the baggage that
Trump and Clinton were perceived as having. His talking point that resonated best with
people was “I’m not Trump or Clinton!” He presented himself as a moderate who was
frustrated with the candidates that the primary system had created. In practice, he was a
typical Republican. He had been the chief policy director to the House Republican
Conference and worked with GOP heavyweights like Paul Ryan and John Boehner. He
also had been a member of the CIA, which boosted his appeal in the patriotic state of
Utah.43 Evan McMullin became a much discussed third option in the state of Utah and
people wondered if they should vote for him so that they would feel comfortable with
their vote. McMullin’s candidacy gained ground and multiple polls suggested that he was
either tied with Trump or within striking distance of winning Utah.44 McMullin’s
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popularity surge in Utah amazed national observers who were stunned that a third-party
candidate was putting together a competitive campaign.
This is the context of Utah leading up to Election Day in 2016. Utah had always
been a state that Republicans could count on for electoral votes in the presidential race.
However, due to the cross pressures Utahns felt as they decided between Donald Trump
and Hillary Clinton, there was no certainty on how Utah would vote, a stark difference to
decades of previous presidential elections.

Methodology
I participated in the 2016 Utah Colleges Exit Poll (UCEP). The Utah Colleges
Exit Poll has been run since 1982 and has been the most accurate exit poll in the state of
Utah. It has been referred to both as “the gold standard of polling” and as the “Cadillac of
exit polling” by Fritz Scheuren, former head of the American Statistics Association.45
The UCEP is run by Professor David Magleby of Brigham Young University. He teaches
the classes of students that plan the exit poll, including writing the poll itself, creating the
statistical model of how the state of Utah will be sampled, recruiting and training
volunteer student pollsters, assigning the pollsters to Election Day locations, inputting the
data, and solving crises that invariably arise on Election Day itself. All of this is done in
conjunction with other colleges and universities in the state of Utah. In 2016, this
included Brigham Young University, the University of Utah, Utah Valley University,
Utah State University, Weber State University, Southern Utah University, and Dixie State
University. The UCEP also worked in conjunction with the Lieutenant Governor’s Office
of the State of Utah. All told, there were approximately 2400 volunteers that participated
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as pollsters on Election Day, which gives an idea of the magnitude of the Utah Colleges
Exit Poll.46
Dr. Magleby explained how the sampling was done in his paper to the American
Political Science Association in 2017. He wrote,
The sample is a multi-mode stratified random sample of Utah Voters designed to
represent the population of voters in each of Utah’s four congressional districts.
The sample is not representative of state legislative districts and not all counties are
in the sample… The modes of the sample were a series of random samples of early
and by-mail voters drawn from the list of voters whose ballots had been returned to
our sample counties. They were contacted by postcard asking them to go online
and complete the poll, and to the extent we could access phone numbers for these
samples multiple attempts were made to contact these voters by telephone. Our
Election Day sample was stratified at the congressional district and county levels,
and for in-person voting counties the voting places were randomly selected (using
a probability proportional to size (PPS) method) as was the sample of voters (using
an interval method). For vote-by-mail counties we erred on the side of including
all vote centers in the Salt Lake, Davis, Weber, and Cache counties.47 … Sampling
weights are applied to account for the PPS sampling design.48
These sampling weights were done by Professor Dan Williams and some
of his statistic students that were involved with the Exit Poll. My study uses this
weighted data to ensure accuracy of the findings across the state of Utah.
The wording of the third-party question was “Would you vote for a candidate
other than Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump if you thought they had a chance to get the
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most votes in Utah?” The answers were “Yes, No, or Don’t Know.” To maximize the
questions that could be asked in the Exit Poll while minimizing survey fatigue by those
responding, we decided to use four different forms—white, green, yellow, and blue. Each
respondent only received one of the four forms. While many of the questions were the
same, such as demographic questions and their votes for their specific races, other
academic questions, like mine, only appeared on one form. Mine appeared on the blue
form.
Our pollsters were given specific instructions. If they asked a person to participate
in our voluntary poll and the individual declined, our pollsters were to fill out a survey
form that included the time of contact and a few facts about the individual who had just
turned down the survey. These “nonresponse” forms were included in the total n of the
survey to ensure that there was no systematic bias in non-responses. Including those
nonresponses to the survey, 51,269 people were surveyed in the 2016 Utah Colleges Exit
Poll. I dropped all the nonresponses which left me with 31,778 responses. From those
31,778 responses, I dropped all the nonresponses to those who did not answer my
question on the blue form. This eliminated individuals who were given the white, green,
and yellow forms, as well as individuals who did answer my question on the blue form. I
also dropped individuals who did not record who they voted for in the presidential race.
This left me with 7,747 people in my subsample.
While this appears to be a lot of drops of data points, there are reasons for these
drops. I cannot run tests on individual responses for people’s views of third-party
candidates if they did not specify their views on third-party candidates. As such, all the
drops were done to narrow in on the specific subset of people who had responded to my
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question. This narrowing in process eliminated three-quarters of those who had
participated in the Utah Colleges Exit Poll and over four-fifths of the total people
surveyed.
Theoretically, these drops make sense. When exit polling is occurring, a necessary
assumption is made by the pollsters that there is no systematic non-response bias. To be
positive that there was no systematic non-response bias, I used a dataset that was
weighted in the weeks after the election to accurately reflect the final vote totals of the
state of Utah. This weighting was done so that political scientists would be able to use the
results of the Exit Poll after the election for projects like this.
The next question is whether or not it is appropriate to drop all the other forms as
I created my subset sample. The blue form was given out to every fourth person
surveyed, and each person surveyed was chosen based on a preset interval. Because the
blue form was given to individuals who were randomly chosen, the blue form
theoretically represents an accurate sub-sample of the entire sample.
Two of the key assumptions that my thesis rests on are that a) the survey was
properly done and that b) my subsample is representative of the sample as a whole. The
statistics professor responsible for weighting this dataset, Dan Williams of BYU, wrote
that the data was weighted to make it representative of Utah’s ten most populous
counties. He also wrote that “What we have found is that the difference in excluding the
least populated counties affects the vote totals only very minimally - not enough to cause
concern that our data estimates particularly on the vote percentage estimates would not be
accurate.”49 This weighting method, in addition to the proper survey methodology,
ensures that our sample represents an accurate view of Utah voters.
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I also statistically validated the representativeness of my subsample (the sample I
used after all the drops) by comparing that subsample to the rest of the sample. Using
STATA, I generated means and confidence intervals for a variety of demographic
characteristics for my subsample and for the other respondents to the survey.50 I
examined the 95% confidence intervals to ensure that there was overlap. The 95%
confidence intervals on “Other” for Party ID do not line up. This is not much of a
problem because on every other demographic variable the confidence intervals overlap,
meaning that p values would be greater than .05 on every other variable when comparing
the subset to the rest of the sample. This strengthens my case that my subsample is
representative of the sample as a whole. To see these 95% confidence intervals, please
refer to Appendix B.
In summary, my subsample does not include respondents who did not fill out the
blue form (which we know was random) and people who did not answer that question but
did fill out the rest of the blue form (which we have to assume was unsystematic,
especially since there is no reason to think that it was systematic). I also dropped those
who did not say who they voted for in the presidential race. These drops were statistically
appropriate and my subsample still represents the state of Utah.
After all those drops, I have 7,747 responses to that question, which is a large
number of respondents. This subsample is the group that I used to examine the strength of
Duverger’s Law.
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Findings and Discussion
The Conflicted Voters
Table 1 shows the distribution of presidential votes from the sample of people
who filled out the blue form and answered my question.

Table 1- Voters from Survey
Candidate

Survey Vote
Percentages

Donald Trump

40% WINNER

Hillary Clinton

31%

Gary Johnson

4%

Evan McMullin

21%

Someone else

3%

Don’t remember

.4%

Did not vote

.6%
100%

I created a new variable to pull out the voters who voted for Trump or Clinton but
preferred a third-party candidate. I coded the variable so that an individual would be
marked as a 1 if they had voted for Trump but would have voted for a third party if they
19

thought the third-party candidates had a chance of winning. This created a category of
Trump voters who would have changed their vote. For Clinton voters, I coded the
variable so that an individual would be marked as a 2 if they had voted for Clinton but
preferred a third-party candidate. This created a category of Clinton voters who would
have changed their vote if they had believed their preferred choice could win. When these
individuals marked as a 1 or 2 are summed up, they are the total of voters who voted for
Clinton and Trump but would have voted for a third candidate, assuming that third-party
candidate was electable. I could have made them both the same number but I wanted
them coded differently because they had acted differently in which mainstream candidate
they had voted for.
After isolating the Trump voters who preferred McMullin but didn’t think
McMullin could win (who I will refer to as conflicted Trump voters), I found there were
1,210 voters who would have changed their vote. After isolating the Clinton voters who
didn’t think a third-party candidate could win. I found there were 860 Clinton voters who
preferred a third-party candidate but would have changed their vote (who I will refer to as
conflicted Clinton voters). These were surprisingly large numbers. Clearly a large
number of voters wanted to defect from their candidates but had not done so. Table 2
shows what happens to the total vote shares of Trump and Clinton in the presidential race
if, hypothetically, their conflicted voters decided to not vote for them.
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Table 2- Support Gained from Conflicted Voters

With

Trump Total Vote

Clinton Total Vote

Share

Share

40%

31%

24%

20%

Conflicted
Voters
Without
Conflicted
Voters

Clinton and Trump both picked up a large number of voters who would have
voted for someone else if they thought the other candidate could win. The fact that they
had so many conflicted voters voting for them is a testament to the strength of Duverger’s
Law. Even when voters felt a strong dislike for both candidates, they still chose one or
the other instead of voting for a third-party candidate. They did not believe a third-party
candidate could win and consequently did not vote for a third-party candidate. This
validates the psychological factor Duverger pointed to as being an integral part of his
law.

The Feelings Thermometer
One of the assumptions that these findings of a severely diminished vote share for
Trump and Clinton rest on is that voters who indicated that they would vote for an
electable third-party would actually do so. If they would have done what they said, then it
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is completely appropriate to remove their votes from their chosen candidate and
reallocate their vote to a third-party candidate’s vote share for this analysis. This section
examines the likelihood that conflicted voters would actually have voted for a third-party
candidate. Their feelings towards McMullin are the basis for analysis in this section for
two reasons. First, McMullin was the most popular third-party candidate in the state of
Utah and it is natural to assume more of the Republican votes would have gone to him
than to other third-party candidates. His popularity is shown by the fact that he had been
tied with Trump and Clinton in many of the polls right before the election.51 He lost by a
significantly larger margin than polls had shown in the weeks leading up to the election,
which this data indicates is because voters decided that he did not have a chance to win in
Utah. The second reason is that data on feelings towards Johnson and Stein were not
gathered by the UCEP, which is a limitation of this study. It is therefore unknown which
third-party candidate conflicted Clinton voters would have preferred.
This necessary assumption that people who indicated that they would have voted
for an electable third-party candidate, such as McMullin, is strengthened by looking at
the feelings of voters towards Trump, Clinton, and McMullin. One of the other questions
on the UCEP asked how voters viewed Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, and Evan
McMullin. Using the categories of conflicted and non-conflicted voters, I compared the
feelings between the groups that they have towards their preferred candidate and towards
Evan McMullin. If the conflicted voters who responded that they would vote for a thirdparty candidate view McMullin more favorably than their chosen candidate (Trump or
Clinton), they are more likely to have actually voted for McMullin if they believed he
could win. Their answers, aggregated by groups, are below.
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Table 3- Feelings of Voters Towards Trump, Clinton, and McMullin52

n
Mean
Feelings
towards
Trump
Median
Feelings
towards
Trump
Standard
Deviation,
Feelings
towards
Trump
Mean
Feelings
towards
Clinton
Median
Feelings
towards
Clinton
Standard
Deviation,
Feelings
towards
Clinton
Mean
Feelings
towards
McMullin
Median
Feelings
Towards
McMullin
Standard
Deviation,
Feelings
towards
McMullin

All
All
All
NonTrump Clinton McMullin Conflicted
Voters Voters Voters
Trump
Voters
3,108 2,403
1,587
1,898
3.448 1.087
1.391
3.833

Conflicted NonTrump
Conflicted
Voters
Clinton
Voters
1,210
1,543
2.838
1.084

Conflicted
Clinton
Voters

3

1

1

4

3

1

1

1.202

0.392

0.701

1.118

1.072

0.392

0.392

1.111

3.737

1.372

1.088

1.146

4.034

3.206

1

4

1

1

1

4

3

0.439

.991

0.728

0.394

0.653

0.877

0.963

2.625

2.665

4.114

2.322

3.128

2.564

2.846

3

3

4

2

3

3

3

1.230

1.055

0.787

1.187

1.131

1.037

1.065
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860
1.09

There are stark differences between conflicted Trump voters and non-conflicted
Trump voters. Non-conflicted Trump voters had a mean feeling of 3.833 towards Trump,
while conflicted Trump voters had a mean feeling of 2.838. This is a large difference, a
difference which is statistically significant with a p value of less than .001. There is also a
significant difference between non-conflicted Trump voters and conflicted Trump voters
feelings towards McMullin. Non-conflicted Trump voters had a mean feeling of 2.322
towards McMullin, while conflicted Trump voters had a mean feeling of 3.128. This
large difference also has a p value of less than .001. This indicates that conflicted Trump
voters viewed McMullin as an acceptable alternative to Trump, strengthening my claim
that they would have actually voted for McMullin if they thought he had a chance to win
Utah.
These findings are also consistent when comparing the mean feelings of nonconflicted Clinton voters and conflicted Clinton voters. Non-conflicted Clinton voters
had a mean feeling of 4.034 towards Clinton, while conflicted Clinton voters had a mean
feeling of 3.206. The p value of that difference in means is less than .001. When
comparing the two groups feelings towards McMullin, non-conflicted Clinton voters had
a mean feeling of 2.564, while conflicted Clinton voters had a mean feeling of 2.846.
This is also statistically significant, with a p value of less than .05. When comparing the
mean feelings of conflicted Clinton voters between McMullin and Clinton, conflicted
Clinton voters did feel more favorably towards Clinton than they did towards McMullin.
However, that difference in the means is less, and the medians are the same. This
difference can be explained by McMullin’s de facto status as a Republican and would
have a few different policy preferences than some conflicted Clinton voters. Because the
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difference is so small and is explainable, it still is realistic that at least some conflicted
Clinton voters would have voted for a third-party candidate. This was demonstrated in the
feelings thermometer apportionment method. These differences between conflicted and
non-conflicted voters are shown in the following figure.
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Figure 1- The Difference of Mean Feelings That Conflicted and Non-Conflicted Voters
Have Towards Their Chosen Candidate and to Evan McMullin

3

Clinton Voters Feelings to Clinton

2

Groups of Voters

Clinton Voters Feelings to McMullin

Trump Voters Feelings to McMullin

1

Trump Voters Feelings to Trump
-1

-.5

0
Difference in Feelings

.5

1

This figure illustrates the differences that conflicted voters feel compared to nonconflicted voters. On the top line, we see the difference of conflicted Clinton voters and
non-conflicted Clinton voters to McMullin. The other labels explain which groups the
difference of means and confidence intervals are for. A point along the zero line would
indicate that conflicted and non-conflicted voters felt the same way about a candidate.
When the point and its confidence interval are on the negative side of the chart, it
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indicates that conflicted voters feel less favorable towards the candidate than the nonconflicted voters. Conversely, when the point and its confidence interval are on the
positive side of the chart, the conflicted voters had a more favorable view of the
candidate than the non-conflicted voters.
Figure 1 demonstrates that conflicted Trump voters had significantly lower views
of Trump than non-conflicted Trump voters did (Group 1). The second point shows that
conflicted Trump voters had higher views of McMullin than non-conflicted Trump voters
did (Group 2). Groups 3 and 4 demonstrate similar findings for Clinton voters views on
their chosen candidate and McMullin. Because there is such a strong difference in
feelings between conflicted Trump voters and non-conflicted Trump voters both of their
views on their chosen candidate and the most popular alternative (McMullin), it is likely
that those conflicted voters would actually have voted for a third-party. This finding is
also true for Clinton voters. There is such a strong difference in feelings between
conflicted Clinton voters and non-conflicted Clinton voters towards Clinton and towards
McMullin that they likely would have actually voted for a third-party candidate.
The assumption that those conflicted voters would have actually voted for Evan
McMullin if they believed he was electable was also supported by his favorability rating
in Utah. In the middle of October, a month before the election, Rasmussen Reports found
that 51% of likely Utah voters had a favorable or somewhat favorable view of McMullin.
Only 26% had a very unfavorable or somewhat unfavorable view of McMullin.53 With
such a high favorability rating, and the large difference in feelings between conflicted
voters and non-conflicted voters, it is very likely that those conflicted voters would have
actually voted for a third-party candidate.
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How to Reapportion The Conflicted Voters?
If, hypothetically, the conflicted voters had followed their preference and voted
for a third-party candidate, which one would they have voted for? This is important
because their decision on which third-party candidate they voted for would determine
who wins the electoral votes of Utah. I used two methods to reapportion conflicted voters
to third-party candidates. Both methods have benefits and drawbacks.
The first way of reapportioning the conflicted voters is by reapportioning them
proportionally. Table 4 shows the initial distribution of presidential votes from the
sample of people who filled out the blue form and answered my question.

Table 4- Voters from Survey
Candidate

Survey Vote
Percentages

Donald Trump

40% WINNER

Hillary Clinton

31%

Gary Johnson

4%

Evan McMullin

21%

Someone else

3%

Don’t remember

.4%

Did not vote

.6%
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100%

Because we don’t know which third-party candidate the conflicted voters would
have gone for, we will reapportion the conflicted Trump voters and conflicted Clinton
voters between McMullin, Johnson, and others in a proportional manner. In the initial
vote count in our subsample, McMullin had 1,587 votes, Johnson had 303, and “someone
else” had 270. We will not apportion any to those who said, “Don’t remember” and those
who did not vote for U.S. president. Proportionally, of the third-party vote, McMullin had
73%, Johnson had 14%, and “someone else” had 13% (all rounded).
Of conflicted Trump voters, McMullin picked up 883 votes (1,210*.73), Johnson
picked up 170 votes (1,210*.14), and “someone else” picked up 157 (1210*.13). (I gave
Johnson the extra vote because he was closest to rounding up. Otherwise it would have
been 169 for Johnson, which is 1,209 overall). Table 5 holds the results of what happens
when we reapportion those who voted for Trump believing that McMullin had little
chance of winning.

Table 5- Voters from Survey, Moving Conflicted Trump Voters to Third-Party
Candidates
Candidate

Survey Vote
Percentages

Donald Trump

24%
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Hillary Clinton

31%

Gary Johnson

6%

Evan McMullin

32%

Someone else

6%

Don’t remember

.4%

Did not vote

.6%
100%

As you can see, McMullin would have come close to winning the state of Utah
with just conflicted Trump voters. The next step is to factor in conflicted Clinton voters.
Of conflicted Clinton voters, McMullin would have picked up 628 votes (860*.73),
Johnson would have picked up 120 votes (860*.14), and “someone else” would have
picked up 112 votes (860*.13). Table 6 adds the conflicted Clinton voters into the results
in Table 4, which already includes Conflicted Trump voters after they were
reapportioned.
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Table 6- Voters from Survey, Moving Conflicted Trump and Clinton Voters to ThirdParty Candidates
Candidate

Survey Vote
Percentages

Donald Trump

24%

Hillary Clinton

20%

Gary Johnson

8%

Evan McMullin

40% WINNER

Someone else

7%

Don’t

.4%

remember
Did not vote

.6%
100%

This finding has some benefits and drawbacks. This method of proportional
reapportionment is done based on the proportion of the third-party vote share that
McMullin, Johnson, and others received in the 2016 election. The reasoning behind this
proportional reapportionment is that it is logical to assume that the third-party vote share
in the election is representative of how Utah voters felt about each candidate. This
method is also simple.
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However, there are no guarantees that this is exactly the percentages of people
that would have voted for McMullin, Johnson, and Stein, although it is plausible. The
biggest drawback with this method is reapportioning Clinton voters. It is very likely that
conflicted Trump voters would have transferred their vote to McMullin if they believed
McMullin could have won. It is much less likely that Clinton voters would have
transferred their vote to McMullin. Many conflicted Clinton voters would have had
substantive policy differences with McMullin, who essentially was a traditional
Republican. As conflicted Clinton voters they would have had less reason than conflicted
Trump voters to throw their support behind McMullin as their third-party candidate, it is
likely that the above table exaggerates the number of votes McMullin would have
received from conflicted Clinton voters.
Because this method probably overstates the support McMullin would have gotten
from conflicted Clinton voters, I reexamined vote shares for third party candidates by
using a different method to reapportion conflicted voters. Instead of using the question
“Would you vote for a candidate other than Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump if you
thought they had a chance to get the most votes in Utah?” I used the feeling thermometer.
This is similar to the methodology used by Abramson in his study.54 I examined the
feelings that all Clinton voters had for McMullin and that all Trump voters had for
McMullin. If a voter had higher feelings for McMullin than their preferred candidate, I
moved their vote from Clinton or Trump into McMullin’s total vote share. After doing so,
I found that 1,242 Trump voters preferred McMullin over Trump. This is higher than
what we found using the proportional reapportionment method in Tables 4, 5, and 6.
Only 200 Clinton voters preferred McMullin over Clinton, which is 428 less than in the
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proportional reapportionment method. This may be closer to the true amount of Clinton
voters that would have voted for McMullin if they thought he had a chance to win. Table
7 has the results after reapportioning the voters according to the feelings thermometer,
pulling out the 1,242 Trump voters and the 200 Clinton voters to add to McMullin’s vote
share. Voters were not asked about their feelings towards Johnson and Stein, which is a
limitation of this analysis, as we cannot predict how many conflicted voters would have
voted for Johnson or Stein.

Table 7- Voters from Survey, Moving Trump and Clinton Voters According to the
Feelings Thermometer
Candidate

Survey Vote
Percentages

Donald Trump

24%

Hillary Clinton

29%

Gary Johnson

4%

Evan McMullin

39% WINNER

Someone else

3%

Don’t

.4%

remember
Did not vote

.6%
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100%

In the feelings reapportionment method, McMullin picked up much more of
Trump voters than he did when proportionally splitting the votes with other third-party
candidates. McMullin received substantially less support from Clinton voters, which
makes more sense considering that Clinton voters have little reason (other than the fact
McMullin is not Clinton) to support a third-party candidate who acts like a traditional
Republican. There are drawbacks to this method though. First, all reapportionment
decisions are made using the feelings thermometer. The UCEP data that asks voters
whether or not they would have voted for an electable third-party candidate is not used in
this method. Because this method of reapportionment does not use that data, the analysis
of Duverger’s Law is more roundabout than if we used the question about third-party
electability. Another drawback is that the voters were not asked about their feelings
towards Gary Johnson and Jill Stein. Because they were not asked, we cannot see what
proportion of votes should be reapportioned to those two candidates.

In What Scenario Could McMullin Have Actually Won Utah?
The two methods of reapportionment, the proportional method and the feeling
thermometer method, both have benefits and drawbacks. The drawbacks are significant
enough that it is unwise to use either method as definitive proof that McMullin would
have won the state of Utah if people had voted for their preference. However, it is within
the realm of reality that Evan McMullin potentially could have won the state of Utah if he
had procured enough votes from the conflicted voters. In Table 1, I found that after
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removing conflicted voters from Trump and Clinton’s vote share but not reapportioning
them to specific third-party candidates, Trump had 24% of the total vote and Clinton had
20%. McMullin already had 21% of the total vote. If even a simple majority of conflicted
Trump voters move over to vote for McMullin, he would have won the state of Utah,
regardless of which third-party candidate conflicted Clinton voters support.

Implications
These results are informative. A significant number of those who voted for Trump
and Clinton did not want to do so. They would have voted for a third-party candidate if
they had believed a third-party candidate could have won the state of Utah. Regardless of
the method used, when these conflicted voters are reapportioned to third-party candidates
Evan McMullin would have won significantly more votes if people had believed he was
electable. He clearly was more preferred by voters than the actual vote count reveals. The
fact he failed to win reflects the strength of the psychological factor of Duverger’s Law—
people will not vote for third-party candidates if they do not think those candidates can
actually win.
The external validity of this study is strong. The candidates and events of the
2016 presidential election, combined with the demographic makeup of Utah, were a
perfect storm of events that gave the UCEP this opportunity to view how voters thought
about third parties in a situation where a third-party could have been seen as a viable
alternative. This situation is not likely to be often repeated. In elections where the
candidates of the two main parties are more popular and the demographic is different,
third-party candidates may not be looked on as favorably as Evan McMullin was in 2016.
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This does not weaken the external validity because the lessons learned about third-party
candidates and Duverger’s Law are still applicable even though most voters will never be
this cross pressured.
These findings are generalizable to other situations. One of the benefits to the
federalist system in the United States is that each state acts as a “laboratory” of
democracy.55 This is the situation in our study. In this case, Utah placed Duverger’s Law
under extreme stress. Utahns traditionally vote Republican, strongly disliked the
Republican candidate, strongly disliked the Democrat candidate, and had a fairly
appealing candidate in McMullin. Even in this situation, a lot of people did not vote for
their true preference because they did not think a third-party candidate could actually
win. This finding that Duverger’s Law holds up under extreme stress is generalizable to
other states, the United States on a national level, and to other countries.
One lesson from these findings are changes that third-party candidates need to
make in their messaging while they campaign. The results make it clear that people knew
who Evan McMullin was. He had a high recognition level in the state and was considered
favorably by a majority of the voters. This name recognition and favorability was not
enough to win though. Because voters did not believe that McMullin had a chance of
winning, the power of his name recognition and favorability was muted. While McMullin
did make some attempts to tell voters that their vote mattered, that Utah had the power to
deny Trump and Clinton the necessary 270 votes to secure the presidency, and that a
Utah poll as late as November 4 showed that he had a chance to hang with Trump in the
Utah election, most of his branding was focused on the fact that he was not Donald J.
Trump.56 That is ultimately what stuck with voters when they went to the polls.
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Future third-party candidates need to make sure that a substantial portion of their
messaging and branding is focused on the viability of their candidacy. A third-party
candidate will benefit more from convincing voters that their campaign can win than
from chasing 100% name recognition with voters. The countries that have notable
exceptions to Duverger’s Law, Canada and India, do so because they have “strong local
minority parties”57 If a third-party is to successfully establish itself in the United States,
they would have to start on a local level and convince the people in one particular region
that they are a viable alternative and can win, rather than focusing on the entire country at
once.
A second lesson from this study is that Duverger’s Law seems to work in part
because people do not believe that a third-party can actually win an election. If they did,
they would vote for a third-party candidate. This finding does not come from a fancy
regression or a complicated index of voters. Rather, it comes from a simple question.
“Would you vote for a candidate other than Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump if you
thought they had a chance to get the most votes in Utah?” This finding is validated by the
feelings thermometer, showing that conflicted voters viewed McMullin favorably enough
to have actually voted for him. The sample size of the people that answered was large
enough that by the Law of Large Numbers we can have a significant amount in the
accuracy of the results. This study statistically validates Duverger’s theory that his law
worked because of psychological aspect of the electoral system, not merely because of
mechanical factors in the system itself.
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Conclusion
A key reason that Duverger’s Law stands is because people will vote for parties
that have a chance at winning the election. This is why in a first past the post system the
electorate coalesces into two distinct parties, with some fringe parties that do not
realistically compete. In the 2016 Utah election, the voters were extremely cross
pressured because they were trapped between two candidates with serious flaws—Donald
Trump and Hillary Clinton. In the Utah College Exit Poll, we found that more people
would have voted for McMullin if they thought he had a chance at winning the election.
While there are too many obstacles to definitively say if he could have actually won or
not, the data is clear that a significantly larger number of people would have voted for
him than actually did. This demonstrates the role that the psychological effect plays in
Duverger’s Law stands because in this example, even though Evan McMullin potentially
had the votes to win Utah, he lost because the voters were convinced that a third-party
candidate did not stand a chance at winning.
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Appendix A- Front Side of Blue Form
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Appendix B- Confidence Intervals of the Demographics of the Subset and the Rest of the
UCEP Sample to Prove Representativeness of the Subset

Gender

Male

Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset

Female

Party ID

Strong
Democrat
Not So Strong
Democrat
Independent
Leaning
Democrat
Independent

Independent
Leaning
Republican
Not So Strong
Republican
Strong
Republican
Other

Don’t Know
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Bottom of
95%
Confidenc
e Interval
.485325

Top of
95%
Confidenc
e Interval
.4997595

.473389
.5002405

.4978699
.514675

.5021301
.0897472

.526611
.1321007

.0994943
.0388003

.1539464
.0513248

.0316029
.10961

.0438707
.1514957

.1019476
.1080053

.133522
.119148

.1140717
.1744762

.1382902
.2059907

.1503035
.0936327

.1846217
.115749

.0818986
.1888437

.1049749
.2427773

.2334997
.0583828

.2894597
.0711839

.0443346
.0268583

.0544072
.0350124

.0229131

.031519

Ideology

Strongly Liberal

Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e

Moderately
Liberal
Middle of the
road
Moderately
Conservative
Strongly
Conservative
Other

Don’t Know

Education

Some High
School
High School
Graduate
Some college

College

Postgraduate

Religion

Protestant

Catholic
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.0645612

.10529

.060718
.1572032

.1108211
.2058952

.1578571
.1495121

.2042599
.1644825

.1362446
.2520284

.1578138
.2981576

.2485689
.2044661

.2915071
.2618033

.2222937
.0258961

.2786693
.0369539

.0237742
.0380204

.0365634
.0482958

.0378621
.0115144

.0479395
.015198

.008462
.1012366

.0134398
.1181451

.0991522
.3140823

.1199904
.3416244

.3080121
.3492506

.3431913
.3796127

.3456686
.1644774

.3753309
.2082405

.1726469
.0441967

.2183342
.0572251

.0412135
.0491757

.0578093
.0716062

Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset

LDS/Mormon

Jewish

Muslim

Other

No
preference/No
affiliation
Religious
Activity

Very Active

Somewhat
active
Not very active

Not Active

Does not apply/
prefer not to say
Employmen
t

Self-employed

Employed by
someone else
Unemployed

41

.0443531
.5108528

.0683223
.6348362

.5283191
.0029044

.6489459
.0056926

.0022556
.0020432

.0051555
.0036785

.0015532
.0632903

.0063304
.085479

.0622154
.1991511

.0864262
.276962

.1910288
.4565268

.2654704
.5530238

.4756506
.1349353

.57213
.1519571

.1235676
.0682569

.1487658
.0813057

.0688529
.085818

.087368
.1230133

.0835061
.1494888

.1152409
.2026697

.1402429
.1292277

.1917148
.1477585

.1286023
.5119527

.1520961
.5868435

.4954777
.0191349

.5814599
.0242982

.0155621

.0247059

Homemaker

Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e

Retired

Student

Race

American
Indian/Native
American
Asian

Black/African
American
Hispanic/Latino

White/Caucasia
n
Pacific Islander

Other

Marital
Status

Married

Divorced

Widowed

Single

42

.0743008

.098175

.0739836
.1163231

.1045541
.202419

.1242298
.0420073

.2193378
.0606097

.0364977
.0111783

.0608281
.0153386

.0091035
.0103009

.0170344
.0184212

.0110296
.0070118

.0183693
.01368

.0077635
.0491532

.013937
.0828667

.0471415
.8377551

.0826283
.8932193

.8390566
.0057354

.8944611
.0101898

.005812
.0211095

.0112198
.0267474

.0191859
.6224566

.0275611
.7139177

.6233161
.0646121

.7240138
.0772653

.0594072
.0241718

.0743177
.0406005

.0232222
.1576636

.0410421
.2314623

Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset
Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset

Living With a
partner
Income

Under $25,000

$25,000 $39,999
$40,000 $54,999
$55,000 $69,999
$70,000 $84,999
$85,000 $99,999
$100,000 $149,999
Over $150,000

Sexual
Orientation

Heterosexual or
Straight
Gay or Lesbian

Bisexual

Transgende
r

Yes

43

.1519157
.0277709

.2273256
.047318

.0288947
.1053209

.0557115
.1411217

.102842
.1192797

.134078
.1416954

.1198158
.123407

.1520579
.1390442

.1171928
.1131779

.1418855
.1249969

.1103073
.1119062

.1309677
.126096

.1109836
.0917261

.1292791
.1064934

.0903969
.1511534

.1120509
.1790246

.1525606
.1023656

.1776685
.1301639

.0976904
.9376824

.1297924
.9629339

.9347431
.0166617

.9637687
.0294549

.0176565
.0197973

.0339182
.034

.0175268
.0054044

.0334047
.0087292

.0051537

.0088393

No

Rest of
Sampl
e
Subset

44

.9912708

.9945956

.9911607

.9948463
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